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On January 7, 1979, Vietnamese forces marched into Phnom Penh, 
Cambodia, fewer than three weeks after their initial invasion, ending the 
three years, eight months, and twenty days of  the Khmer Rouge’s reign 
of  terror. Utilizing the same strategy that had been used to defeat South 
Vietnam in 1975, the Vietnamese were able to rout the undersupplied and 
unpopular Khmer Rouge soldiers with minimal effort.1 
Upon entering Phnom Penh, the Vietnamese established the 
People’s Republic of  Kampuchea (PRK), placing it under the control of  
a succession of  former Khmer Rouge military leaders. Over the next ten 
years, Cambodia started to rebuild under the guidance of  the Vietnamese. 
Part of  this task involved re-assimilating Cambodians who had fled the 
country over the past decade during the chaos of  the Lon Nol and Pol Pot 
regimes.2 Although few, if  any, Cambodians made it through the rule of  
the Khmer Rouge (KR) unscathed, the Viet-Cambodians arguably bore the 
brunt of  the KR’s discriminatory policies, while the Sino-Cambodians had a 
more varied experience. 
Figures for international migration indicate that by 1979, hundreds 
of  thousands of  ethnically Vietnamese and Chinese Cambodians had fled 
the country.3,4 However, while the pre-war populations of  the two groups in 
1 Elizabeth Becker, When the War Was Over: Cambodia and the Khmer Rouge Revolution 
(1st PublicAffairs ed. New York: PublicAffairs, 1998), 432.
2 Lon Nol governed Cambodia as President of  the Khmer Republic from 1970-
1975. In April 1975 he lost the Cambodian Civil War to the Khmer Rouge forces 
and fled to the United States. Pol Pot was the leader of  Democratic Kampuchea 
during its existence from 1975-1979, and then continued to lead the Khmer Rouge 
resistance against the central government until 1997. 
3 Margaret Slocomb, An Economic History of  Cambodia In the Twentieth Century 
(Singapore: NUS Press, 2010), 198.
4 The largest ethnic group in Cambodia is the Khmer, comprising around 90% 
of  the population. Vietnamese follows them at 5%, and Chinese at 1%, with the 
remaining 4% made up of  a number of  different ethnic groups.
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Cambodia were approximately the same, data show that they certainly did 
not recover at the same rate following the establishment of  the PRK. In-
deed, the Viet-Cambodian population skyrocketed from fewer than 30,000 
in 1978 to at least 300,000 by the mid-1980s.5 The Sino-Cambodian popu-
lation, in contrast, numbered only around 61,000 in the mid-1980s, down 
from a 1970s population of  several hundred thousand.6 
Despite promising equality in its constitution, the PRK systemat-
ically put the Sino-Cambodians at a disadvantage in a range of  endeavors, 
favoring the Viet-Cambodians. This was the result not just of  official policy, 
but also a slanted implementation of  laws that benefitted those of  the same 
ethnicity as the Vietnamese occupiers of  Cambodia. An important caveat 
to this, though, is the extent to which many Vietnamese living in Cambo-
dia, having fled Vietnam shortly after the communist victory, were viewed 
suspiciously by the Vietnamese government. The policies toward the ethnic 
Chinese and Vietnamese were reflective of  the ongoing tension between 
China and Vietnam throughout the PRK’s existence as well as a warped 
Marxist economic system that resulted from favoring the ethnic Vietnam-
ese. Regardless of  politics, on an individual level, the policy impact on the 
treatment of  Sino-Cambodians and Viet-Cambodians by ethnic Khmers 
was generally minimal. Suspicions toward the ethnic Vietnamese persisted, 
and most Khmers did not believe the anti-Chinese propaganda.
Democratic Kampuchea (1975-1979)
 Before examining the People’s Republic of  Kampuchea, I will 
briefly survey the history of  government policy towards ethnically Chinese 
and Vietnamese Cambodians during the reign of  the Khmer Rouge in 
Democratic Kampuchea (DK). The brief  but violent period during which 
the Khmer Rouge controlled Cambodia caused millions of  deaths and the 
destruction of  Cambodia’s infrastructure. In order to properly contextualize 
the environment in which the PRK came to power, it is important to first 
examine how the policies of  DK were implemented.
Article 13 of  the Constitution of  Democratic Kampuchea states: 
There must be complete equality among all 
Kampuchean people in an equal, just, democratic, 
harmonious, and happy society [in which] men 
and women are fully equal in every respect.7 
Although the wording in the DK Constitution espouses egalitarianism, it 
5 Ramses Amer, “Cambodia’s Ethnic Vietnamese: Minority Rights and Domestic 
Politics,” Asian Journal of  Social Science 34 (3). Brill (2006): 390-391.
6 Slocomb, An Economic History of  Cambodia, 196-199.
7 Cambodia, Constitution of  Democratic Kampuchea, Art. 13. Accessed April 25, 2016 
http://www.d.dccam.org/Archives/Documents/DK_Policy/DK_Policy_DK_
Constitution.htm. 
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begs several important questions. First and foremost, what does it mean to 
be “Kampuchean”? In this context, it is important to analyze how the DK 
regime treated those who were ethnically non-Khmer, specifically those of  
Vietnamese or Chinese descent.
 The DK regime was rabidly anti-Vietnamese, and over the course 
of  just a few years, it slaughtered thousands of  Viet-Cambodians. At the 
same time, DK policy was more ambiguous toward the Sino-Khmer, no 
doubt due in part to both the large amount of  aid China was providing to 
support DK and the ethnic Chinese background of  many of  the Khmer 
Rouge’s top leaders. 
 After supporting and training the Khmer Rouge for years, the com-
munists in Vietnam were gaining full control of  their country at the same 
time Phnom Penh was falling to the Khmer Rouge in April 1975. Because 
of  the shared history between the two countries’ communist movements, 
Hanoi at one point called for “common diplomatic and economic policies” 
in addition to a “united party” and “united army” with DK.8 Despite the 
assurances of  then-North Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Van Dong to 
Cambodian King Norodom Sihanouk in 1970 that Vietnam would respect 
Cambodia’s sovereignty and territory following the end of  the Cambodian 
Civil War, the Khmer Rouge’s trust in Vietnam was at best tenuous.9 Indeed, 
despite Vietnam largely withdrawing its soldiers from Cambodian territory 
in 1975, peace was fragile, and, by 1977, DK was fighting the communists 
who ironically had helped establish Cambodia’s first communist cells in 
Kampong Cham decades earlier.10 
While outright hostilities with Vietnam were relatively subdued at 
first, Viet-Cambodians were not so lucky. In an interview with Yale Univer-
sity professor Ben Kiernan, Heng Samrin, who would become one of  the 
leaders of  the People’s Republic of  Kampuchea, recalled that early on in 
DK, Pol Pot prioritized ridding Cambodia of  all Vietnamese people, with 
Nuon Chea adding, “we cannot allow any Vietnamese minority [in Cambo-
dia].”11,12
In practice, this eradication of  the Vietnamese minority took sever-
al forms. Already, at least 200,000 Cambodians of  Vietnamese descent had 
been expelled from the country in 1970 by the Lon Nol government, and 
120,000 more ethnic Vietnamese residents of  Cambodia had fled before the 
Khmer Rouge’s victory in 1975.13 Under the Khmer Rouge, ethnic Vietnam-
8 Pao-min Chang, Kampuchea Between China and Vietnam (Singapore: Singapore 
University Press, National University of  Singapore, 1985), 41.
9 Ibid., 42.
10 Ben Kiernan and Chanthou Boua, Peasants and Politics In Kampuchea, 1942-1981 
(London: Zed Press, 1982), 213, 287-288.
11 Ben Kiernan, The Pol Pot Regime: Race, Power, and Genocide In Cambodia Under the 
Khmer Rouge, 1975-79 (3rd ed. New Haven [Conn.]: Yale University Press, 2008), 58.
12 Nuon Chea was Pol Pot’s second-in-command. 
13 Slocomb, An Economic History of  Cambodia, 196.
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ese were quickly rounded up, and by September 1975, 150,000 had been 
sent to Vietnam. Although some were massacred en route, for the most 
part they were able to leave DK. However, this policy was reversed by mid-
1976, with ethnic Vietnamese prohibited from leaving the country.14 
According to Heng Samrin, this is when massacres of  Vietnamese 
civilians began, not because of  high-level directives from Pol Pot or Nuon 
Chea, but because anti-Vietnamese directives were interpreted on the local 
level as calling for massacres. This, though, would change on April 1, 1977, 
when the “Directive from 870” called for the arrest of  all ethnic Viet-
namese, in addition to Khmers who spoke Vietnamese or had Vietnamese 
friends.15 At this point explicitly sanctioned massacres of  ethnic Vietnamese 
began to occur, with tens to hundreds being killed at a time.16
While there clearly was large-scale officially condoned violence 
against ethnic Vietnamese Cambodians in DK, whether or not this existed 
for Cambodians of  Chinese descent is harder to discern. The DK strictly 
prohibited speaking languages other than Khmer, and by sending the mainly 
urban Chinese out into the countryside, it greatly disrupted their traditional 
social networks. However, those who assimilated with Khmer culture gener-
ally survived the DK period more or less unscathed, all things considered.17
On the one hand, Penny Edwards points out that although roughly 
two-thirds of  ethnic Chinese in DK were engaged in commercial activity in 
cities when the KR took power, there are no signs that the DK government 
specifically targeted them. She backs up her claim with her finding that 
despite comprising the majority Chinese group in trade and education prior 
to 1975, the Teochiu dialect group proportionally had the fewest deaths. 
This, according to Edwards, “undermines the theory that Chinese victims 
of  DK rule were automatically persecuted on the grounds of  capitalist or 
intellectual backgrounds.”18 Similarly, Ben Kiernan supports this analysis 
with research that indicates that, in general, ethnic Chinese were treated 
no differently than ethnic Khmer and reported no racial discrimination or 
persecution. When ethnic Chinese were singled out, Kiernan notes, it was 
usually because, after having had a relatively comfortable lifestyle before 
the revolution, they were sometimes unwilling to do manual labor in the 
countryside.19  
On the other hand, journalist Elizabeth Becker argues that al-
though conditions varied from region to region in DK, Sino-Cambodians 
were still the victims of  violence because of  their ethnicity, and the only 
reason they were spared the same fate as the Buddhist monks or Chams 
14 Kiernan, The Pol Pot Regime, 296.
15 Ibid., 296-297.
16 Ibid., 298.
17 Sambath Chan, “The Chinese Minority in Cambodia: Identity Construction and 
Contestation” PhD diss., Concordia University, 2005, 56-57.
18 Penny Edwards quote in Slocomb, An Economic History of  Cambodia, 198.
19 Kiernan, The Pol Pot Regime, 298-299.
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was because of  DK’s close relationship with Beijing.20,21 According to her 
primary source, a Sino-Khmer businessman from Phnom Penh, the eth-
nic Chinese were frequently suppressed to, as Pol Pot put it, “ensure the 
perenniality of  the Kampuchean race.”22 Despite this alleged suppression, 
though, no specific anti-Chinese policies were mentioned, in contrast to the 
Directive from 870 dealing with the ethnic Vietnamese. While the ethnic 
Chinese certainly suffered from abuses, it appears that they were not target-
ed as a race anywhere near the extent that the Vietnamese were. This was 
likely due to the massive amount of  aid DK was receiving from China and 
the Chinese ancestry of  many of  DK’s top leaders.
Although the DK Constitution guaranteed certain rights to the 
Kampuchean people, the term “Kampuchean” excluded everything that 
was non-Khmer. Under the DK regime, the Vietnamese minority living in 
Cambodia arguably suffered the most. They were the direct recipient of  
targeted pogroms and policies designed not just to eliminate their culture 
and language, but also their existence as a group in Cambodia. As shall be 
shown in the following sections, the status of  the ethnic Vietnamese and 
Chinese in Cambodia greatly changed over the course of  the following 
decade in the People’s Republic of  Kampuchea.
The People’s Republic of Kampuchea
 Established after the Vietnamese toppled the Khmer Rouge in Jan-
uary 1979, from the very beginning, the PRK was dominated by Vietnam 
and its occupying army. Accordingly, for much of  the PRK’s ten years of  
existence, policy favored the ethnic Vietnamese, who returned to Cambodia 
en masse. All of  this was occurring at the same time as a brief  but bloody 
border war between China and Vietnam in 1979, following Vietnam’s 
invasion of  China-backed Democratic Kampuchea as well as an insurgency 
led by the KR and other armed opposition groups. Meanwhile, China was 
also formally reestablishing ties with Vietnam’s erstwhile enemy, the United 
States, and the Soviet Union was scaling back their presence in Asia. To take 
the evolving geopolitical situation of  the time into account to add context 
to the domestic policies promulgated by the PRK government is therefore 
important. Many of  the policies toward the Chinese and Vietnamese chal-
lenged Cambodians’ traditional views and relations with these groups and 
to an extent ran against the economic realities of  the time.
Policy and Practice
 Ratified on June 27, 1981, after several previous drafts had failed 
20 Becker, When the War Was Over, 228.
21 Thousands of  monks and members of  the Cham ethnic minority were massacred 
by the Khmer Rouge.
22 Ibid., 245.
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to gain the approval of  the Vietnamese government, the Constitution of  
the People’s Republic of  Kampuchea explicitly granted equality to all of  
Cambodia’s ethnicities after the discrimination during the Democratic Kam-
puchea era. As shown below, whereas the DK Constitution, quoted above, 
nominally gave equality just to the vaguely defined “Kampuchean people,” 
Article 5 of  the PRK Constitution stated that:
The state carries out a policy of  unity and equal-
ity among the people of  all nationalities living in 
the national community of  Kampuchea.
All nationalities must love and help each other. 
All acts of  discrimination against, oppression 
of  and division among the nationalities are 
prohibited.
The languages and scripts as well as good customs 
and habits of  the nationalities are respected.
The state takes care of  ethnic minorities so they 
can rise to the common level. The state pays 
special attention to the development of  economy, 
education, culture, social affairs, health and 
communications in the mountainous regions and 
remote areas.23
However, it soon became clear that despite the equality touted in 
the Constitution, in practice, the PRK government consistently discrim-
inated against ethnic minorities, specifically the Chinese. Whereas some 
scholars, such as Michael Vickery, assert that there were no laws or official 
statements that explicitly supported discrimination along ethnic lines, the 
evidence suggests that there were actually a number of  policies, especial-
ly in the first few years of  the PRK, that were specifically targeted at the 
Sino-Cambodians.24 Furthermore, despite the belief  of  many Cambodians 
that Vietnamese immigration was designed to bring Cambodia even more 
under Vietnam’s control through what was known as “Vietnamization,” 
many of  the ethnic Vietnamese returning to Cambodia after fleeing the 
Khmer Rouge were viewed with suspicion by the government and faced a 
number of  obstacles to re-assimilating to life in Cambodia. What ultimately 
emerged early on in the PRK, though, was a stratified system in which eth-
nicity, in this case Chinese and Vietnamese, replaced the class-based Marxist 
system to which the government in theory adhered.25 However, the extent 
23 Albert P Blaustein and Gisbert H Flanz, Constitutions of  the Countries of  the World: 
A Series of  Updated Texts, Constitutional Chronologies and Annotated Bibliographies 
(Permanent ed. Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, 1971).
24 Michael Vickery, Kampuchea: Politics, Economics, and Society (London: F. Pinter, 1986).
25 It should be noted, though, that the discrimination the ethnic Chinese and 
Vietnamese faced in the PRK was nowhere near as bad as the treatment they 
received under the Khmer Rouge.
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of  discrimination would start to change after 1985.
It appears that almost from the inception of  the PRK government, 
discrimination against Sino-Cambodians became institutionalized. In 1981, 
just a few years after the Vietnamese toppled DK, Pen Sovan, the secretary 
general of  the ruling Kampuchean People’s Revolutionary Party (KPRP), 
stated that “we do not choose ethnic Chinese or train them to be cadres or 
use them in jobs in enterprises either.”26
While the ethnic Chinese were excluded from government and 
Party posts, in the years immediately following the establishment of  the 
PRK, the ethnic Chinese who returned to Cambodia started to reestablish 
the commercial enterprises they had been engaged in before DK. Primarily 
in Phnom Penh and provincial capitals, they would sell goods ranging from 
gold to cigarettes. These businesses prospered to the extent that, by 1981, 
there were at least 2,000 of  these operations, vastly outnumbering the mea-
sly 60 state-run operations established by the PRK government.27
To combat this embarrassment, the government planned to expel 
the “big businesspeople,” give their houses to the state, and “break up 
the big noodle houses, the small markets, and the motor scooter and car 
repair shops.”28 How the government would implement this was extremely 
ambiguous with conflicting statements about what would happen to the 
Chinese and when the final plans would be implemented. Khang Sarin, an 
advisor to the Ministry of  the Interior, first stated that ethnic Chinese who 
engaged in commerce would be sent to the countryside, but immediately 
contradicted himself  by implying merchants would only need to pay heavy 
taxes to the state. As state production capacity was still lagging, Khang 
Sarin then suggested waiting to cut off  private enterprise until after “state 
commerce increases a lot.”29 Ultimately, the most that happened was that a 
few restaurants closed, but there was no large scale emptying the cities of  
merchants.30,31 While the government sporadically deported “vagrants” from 
Phnom Penh to the countryside, it does not appear that this was specifically 
targeted toward the ethnic Chinese.32
After enjoying some initial commercial successes, the Sino-Cambo-
26 Margaret Slocomb, The People’s Republic of  Kampuchea, 1979-1989: The Revolution 
After Pol Pot (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 2003), 135.
27 Evan Gottesman, Cambodia After the Khmer Rouge: Inside the Politics of  Nation 
Building (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 175-176.
28 Ibid., 177.
29 Ibid., 178.
30 Ibid., 178-179.
31 This is distinct from the efforts of  the Vietnamese army in February and March 
1979 to evacuate market towns in a move that alienated many ethnic Chinese. Many 
Sino-Cambodians fled to Thailand, where most were forced by the Thai military 
to return to Cambodia [Stephen R Heder, Kampuchean Occupation and Resistance 
(Bangkok: Institute of  Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University, 1980), 23-25.].
32 Ibid., 179-180.
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dians soon found new policies increasingly restricted their business opera-
tions. One early example is the Circular Concerning the Ethnic Chinese in 
Kampuchea. Issued in 1982, this circular raised concern that:
The Beijing Chinese expansionists, American imperialists and other 
imperialist groups, the Thai reactionaries along with their lackeys, 
Pol Pot, Khieu Samphan, Son Sann, have used some ethnic Chinese 
to be their lackeys in order to do espionage activities, psychological 
warfare, economic sabotage, creating panic in the markets, et cetera.
The circular cast a wide net to tie the ethnic Chinese to all of  the PRK’s 
main opponents. However, rather than restrict the Sino-Cambodians direct-
ly, the circular instead encouraged Vietnamese solidarity and vigilance.33
Although the circular may not have created formal institutions to 
suppress the Sino-Cambodians, Government Policy 351, enacted in 1983, 
is a prime example of  the institutional isolation the ethnic Chinese faced. 
Government Policy 351 called for a nationwide census of  Sino-Cambo-
dians that included photographs and systematic registration. This registry 
ostensibly served to root out networks of  Chinese infiltrators working to 
undermine the country, but, in reality, the goal of  the policy, as one police 
officer claimed, was “to find out where their [Chinese] capital came from.”34 
Government Policy 351 effectively provided the basis to persecute Si-
no-Cambodians by denying them job opportunities and cultural freedom.35 
It codified what Pen Sovan declared two years earlier, barring Cambodian 
Chinese from holding administrative jobs in the government as well as po-
sitions within the KPRP. These restrictions extended to banning the display 
of  Chinese characters in storefronts, prohibiting traditional festivals, and 
shutting down Chinese newspapers and schools.36 At its worst, Sino-Cam-
bodians could be randomly imprisoned for alleged pro-Chinese activities, or 
simply disappear.37
This systematic discrimination alienated many Sino-Cambodians 
from ethnic Khmers who feared reprisals for being caught associating 
with the Chinese. Because of  the ease with which one could be classified 
as Chinese or a “351”, as it became colloquially known, some took drastic 
steps to protect themselves. The most common steps taken by people were 
to become as overtly Khmer as possible by speaking only Khmer in public, 
changing their complexion through surgery or tanning, or bribing officials 
to obtain an official ‘Khmer’ background.38 Although by 1985 the active 
anti-Chinese discrimination began to die down, it appears that the policies 
partially achieved their goals of  limiting Chinese activity in the PRK. By the 
33 Slocomb, The People’s Republic of  Kampuchea, 296.
34 Chan, “The Chinese Minority in Cambodia”, 60.
35 Ibid., 59.
36 Slocomb, An Economic History of  Cambodia, 199.
37 Chan, “The Chinese Minority in Cambodia”, 60.
38 Ibid., 61.
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mid-1980’s, the ethnic Cambodian population had rebounded from a low of  
about 30,000 in DK to just around 61,000.39
Despite constitutional protections, the PRK government clearly 
spent the first half  of  the 1980s trying to demonize the ethnic Chinese 
as capitalist antirevolutionaries to prevent them from taking important 
official positions. This stands in stark contrast to official policy aimed at 
the Viet-Cambodians, who frequently had engaged in commerce before 
the Khmer Rouge took control. One explanation could be that because 
Viet-Cambodians not only shared a language and culture with Vietnam, 
but many had also spent at least the past four years there during DK, they 
would be favored heavily by the new regime. As we shall see, despite some 
tensions, PRK policy and practice toward the ethnic Vietnamese was indeed 
generally preferential, and was perhaps the only period in modern Cambo-
dian history to be so.40
Virtually anything would have been better than the treatment the 
Viet-Cambodians received under the Khmer Rouge. However, one issue 
that remained unresolved was whether or not the ethnic Vietnamese living 
in Cambodia were citizens of  Cambodia or Vietnam. This was never com-
pletely resolved, and as the PRK solidified its legal and judicial institutions, 
this was often a sticking point. As scholar Evan Gottesman demonstrates 
through two brief  case studies, Vietnamese advisors in Cambodia would on 
occasion directly intervene in legal cases against ethnic Vietnamese to pres-
sure Cambodian authorities to step down. However, the defendants in these 
cases do not appear to have been targeted just because they were ethnically 
Vietnamese. Rather, they were ethnically Vietnamese people who commit-
ted crimes in Cambodia and were ultimately exonerated due to Vietnamese 
diplomatic pressure.41 
In the PRK Constitution article quoted above, there are multiple 
references to “nationalities” living in Cambodia. This applied implicitly to 
the Vietnamese, who were divided into three categories: those who had fled 
Cambodia and returned, those who came after 1979, and those who came 
after 1982.42 This was established by a 1982 policy directive that was later 
elaborated by another 1983 policy directive stating that the Vietnamese in 
the first two categories were free to work in Cambodia and could expect 
some degree of  government assistance, while the third group would have to 
get special permission to enter the country to live and work. Since the PRK 
could not control its borders, this was essentially a moot point.43 Interest-
ingly, nowhere in these documents are any Vietnamese referred to as ethnic 
39 Slocomb, An Economic History of  Cambodia, 199.
40 Amer, “Cambodia’s Ethnic Vietnamese”, 401.
41 Gottesman, Cambodia After the Khmer Rouge, 167-168.
42International Centre for Ethnic Studies. Minorities In Cambodia. ([Kandy]: 
International Centre for Ethnic Studies, 1995), 21.
43 Ibid., 21-22.
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minority citizens. Instead, they are all foreign residents.44 This provides one 
explanation as to how the Vietnamese were able to legally justify the prefer-
ential treatment of  those they viewed as fellow Vietnamese citizens. How-
ever, it certainly did not do anything to allay the fears of  many Cambodians 
that hundreds of  thousands of  Vietnamese nationals were pouring into the 
country to “Vietnamize” it. 
One of  the most controversial aspects of  the occupation was the 
issue of  the hundreds of  thousands of  Vietnamese who were emigrating 
from Vietnam to Cambodia. While official PRK estimates claim that around 
56,000 Vietnamese “residents” were in Cambodia, the opposition Coali-
tion Government of  Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) claimed that the 
number was closer to 600,000, and today many scholars believe the figure is 
somewhere between 300,000 and 450,000.45 Nominally, the PRK “sought to 
restrict Vietnamese migration but not to prevent it,” but in actuality, it con-
tinued more or less unabated due to both a lack of  desire and capability.46
Although the top leaders of  the PRK were handpicked by the 
Vietnamese, there were a few who refused to be completely controlled by 
Hanoi. Among them was Pen Sovan, the first Prime Minister of  the PRK.47 
The policies he advocated were not meant to discriminate against the ethnic 
Vietnamese, but rather put them on a level playing field with the rest of  the 
population. Furthermore, he made it clear that the PRK had no desire to 
deport Vietnamese residents who had lived for a long time in Cambodia. 
Rather, they simply wanted the authority to control immigration into their 
country. Ultimately, though, the government lacked the ability to deport 
immigrants and manage its borders.48 
As Pen Sovan continued to defy Vietnamese control on issues 
ranging from immigration to taxes and anti-Vietnamese sentiment began 
to spread through the top levels of  the PRK, Vietnam decided enough was 
enough. After less than a year in office, Vietnamese troops arrested Pen So-
van on December 2, 1981, for, as then-Foreign Minister Hun Sen supposed-
ly said, opposing Vietnam with “narrow-minded nationalism” and pursuing 
policies that “betrayed communist principles.” For the next ten years, the 
government imprisoned Pen Sovan in Hanoi without trial.49
Following the disposal of  Pen Sovan, the favoritism shown toward 
the ethnic Vietnamese only increased. In Phnom Penh, the number of  Viet-
namese engaged in various commercial activities, the same kind the Chinese 
were nominally prohibited from undertaking, quickly grew to over 19,000. 
44 Ibid., 22.
45 Amer, “Cambodia’s Ethnic Vietnamese”, 391.
46 Zachary Abuza, “The Khmer Rouge and the Crisis of  Vietnamese Settlers in 
Cambodia”. Contemporary Southeast Asia 16 (4). Institute of  Southeast Asian Studies 
(ISEAS): (1995), 435.
47 Gottesman, Cambodia After the Khmer Rouge, 125.
48 Ibid., 125-126.
49 Ibid., 131.
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There they enjoyed Vietnamese-language schools and branches of  the 
Cambodian-Vietnamese Friendship Association, which served to connect 
members of  the Vietnamese community with city officials.50 Additionally, 
many of  the directives that most directly benefited the ethnic Vietnamese 
were passed after Sovan’s deposition. The Vietnamese were given jobs and 
land, with around a quarter of  the Vietnamese families in Cambodia receiv-
ing land and housing as a result of  these benefits.51 Nothing is mentioned 
about providing for other Cambodians, many of  whom lived on collectiv-
ized plots of  land.
However, it would be incorrect to say that all Vietnamese living in 
Cambodia were treated equally. In particular, the Vietnamese officials in the 
PRK government were extremely suspicious of  so-called “bad elements” 
that sought to undermine the Cambodian and Vietnamese revolutions. This 
group consisted mainly of  defectors from the Vietnamese army, people 
fleeing southern Vietnam trying to make their way elsewhere overseas, and, 
worst of  all, anticommunist “soldiers from the old army [South Vietnam] 
and other bad people.”52 
The Vietnamese officials controlling Cambodia seemed to be 
almost as afraid of  these “bad elements” as they were of  the Chinese. To 
better monitor and control the Vietnamese, they were placed in Solidarity 
Groups with the goal of  “consolidat[ing] the Vietnamese residents in order 
to teach the policies of  the Cambodian revolution and the Vietnamese rev-
olution, mutual assistance, ceaseless solidarity, etc.”53,54 The leaders of  these 
groups were expected to be vigilant, and, between 1983 and 1985, more 
than one hundred people were allegedly arrested as part of  nine conspira-
cies of  “Thieu Vietnamese traitors.”55 In reality, many of  the Vietnamese 
immigrants went to Cambodia because they had found it difficult to make a 
living in southern Vietnam, and very few were communists.56
Why does this discrepancy between the treatment of  Sino-Cam-
bodians and Viet-Cambodians exist? Vietnam’s occupation of  Cambodia 
provided a safety net to ethnic Vietnamese in a country that historically was 
at best suspicious of  them and at worst slaughtered them. One reason why 
the Chinese faced such discrimination is because of  the ongoing geopoliti-
cal situation with Vietnam and China. Another explanation, however, arises 
50 Ibid., 163.
51 Ibid., 163; Cambodia.. Policy of  the People’s Republic of  Kampuchea with Regard to 
Vietnamese Resident[s]. [Phnom Penh]: Press Dept., Ministry of  Foreign Affairs, 
People’s Republic of  Kampuchea, 1983, 11-12.
52 Gottesman, Cambodia After the Khmer Rouge, 165.
53 Ibid., 165-166.
54 Solidarity Groups could be created along professional or ethnic lines, with most 
corresponding to ethnicity.
55 This refers to followers of  the former president of  South Vietnam, Nguyen Van 
Thieu.
56 Ibid., 165-166.
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from Frank Parkin’s critique of  Marxist class theory.
Parkin argues that the most damaging factor in a class-based society 
is that “it cannot account properly for those complexities that arise when 
racial, religious, ethnic, and sexual divisions run at a tangent to formal class 
divisions.”57 He goes on to point out that in many cases, the collective social 
attributes of  those in a group are important in class formation. That is to 
say, for example, it matters whether merchants are ethnically Vietnamese or 
Chinese, which can create social divisions.58
Because of  the controlling influence of  the Vietnamese on the 
PRK government, an ethnic stratification formed that supplanted the class 
structure that theoretically should have formed. As shown by Policy 351 in 
1983 and the earlier discussions about shutting down the Chinese “big busi-
nesspeople,” while Viet-Cambodians were able to continue their capitalistic 
pursuits with Vietnamese protection, a sort of  social closure formed. This 
social closure refers to “a process by which social groups attempt to max-
imize their rewards by restricting the access of  other groups to resources 
and opportunities.”59 
Social closure manifests itself  in two forms: collectivist and indi-
vidualist. On the individualist side is something like the Soviet system of  
nomenklatura, which compared individuals for positions based on ideological 
and party dedication.60 A collectivist exclusion would be based on ethnicity, 
such as the discrimination against the Sino-Cambodians in the PRK when 
considering whom to give preference for jobs or who would be allowed to 
run small businesses. 
In the collectivist exclusion model present in the PRK, the au-
thorities sought repeatedly with varying degrees of  success to shut down 
enterprise to preserve the integrity of  the Marxist system.61 Even though it 
appears that on occasion the government targeted Vietnamese in addition 
to the Chinese for their bourgeois tendencies, the influence of  the Viet-
namese government was such that rather than treating all capitalists equally, 
the traditional class structure was perverted to realign along ethnic lines 
where the Viet-Cambodians could operate more or less as they wished. In 
contrast, under Policy 351, the Chinese had to be careful of  their actions, 
fearing that a misstep could lead to them disappearing or being sent to reed-
ucation camps. 
While this provides a convincing framework for the PRK before 
1985, it does not explain why things started to liberalize after 1985. Do-
57 Frank Parkin, Marxism and Class Theory: A Bourgeois Critique (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1979), 4.
58 Ibid., 5.
59 Robert Miles, Racism and Migrant Labour (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1982), 154.
60 Parkin, Marxism and Class Theory, 67.
61 Following Vietnam’s liberation of  Cambodia, Vietnam imposed a Marxist-
Leninist government there modeled off  of  the one in Vietnam. 
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mestically, the main reason was the changes brought about following the 
KPRP’s Fifth Party Congress in 1985.62
At the Fifth Party Congress, Hun Sen was installed as Prime Min-
ister. Not unlike Sihanouk and the French several decades earlier, the ability 
of  the Vietnamese to influence a young Hun Sen when he was the PRK’s 
Foreign Minister no doubt played a strong role in the decision to elevate 
him to Prime Minister.63 However, once in power, Hun Sen was not as easy 
to control as the Vietnamese had originally planned, and he quickly worked 
to consolidate power. Along with President of  the National Assembly Chea 
Sim, Hen Sen replaced almost all of  those with heavy backing from Hanoi, 
with only five out of  the thirty-one members of  the KPRP’s central com-
mittee after the congress being from the Khmer Viet Minh.64
Following the Fifth Party Congress, it appears there were no offi-
cial changes in policy toward the ethnic Vietnamese or Chinese. However, 
there was a change in whom the government referred to as enemies. A shift 
in rhetoric following the congress can be seen in an exchange Hun Sen 
had with a visiting delegation from the East German Ministry of  Justice in 
1986. Even as the war with the Khmer Rouge continued to escalate, rather 
than discussing China as a threat to the PRK, he only singled out the “Pol 
Potists” as perpetrating crimes in Cambodia.65  While one quote does not 
show a trend, this statement seems consistent with events under Hun Sen’s 
rule in the PRK, which, though corrupt, did not single out the Vietnamese 
or Chinese for crimes of  an economic nature or otherwise.
Additionally, starting in 1984 it became abundantly clear that the 
collectivized system that had been in effect in the PRK was not working. 
There was no system in place to ensure that collectives got the resources 
they needed, and in fact, many local cadre were actively involved in selling 
off  collectives’ land. While the Party knew that their policies were not work-
ing, they were not sure how to enact reforms while still ensuring stability.66 
Indeed, President Heng Samrin acknowledged during his report to the 
KPRP’s Fifth Party Congress in October 1985 that government actions 
were not in line with the reality in the country. He noted that it was “imper-
ative to continue to build the party into a solid Marxist-Leninist party with 
a correct political line… to make the party a vanguard detachment of  the 
Cambodian working class animated by a heroic fighting will, absolutely loyal 
to the interests of  the working class and laboring masses of  Cambodia.”67
In the end, Heng Samrin failed to accomplish these goals. As 
membership in the KPRP rapidly increased from 10,000 in 1986 to 22,000 
62 The following section will discuss the international aspect of  this.
63 Gottesman, Cambodia After the Khmer Rouge, 208-209.
64 Slocomb, The People’s Republic of  Kampuchea, 200.
65 Gottesman, Cambodia After the Khmer Rouge, 200.
66 Ibid., 272-274.
67 Slocomb, The People’s Republic of  Kampuchea, 198-199.
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in 1988, ideological training increasingly fell to the wayside.68 At the same 
time, the situation in the country looked dire. Across the board, economic 
targets were consistently missed by upwards of  fifty percent, salaries were 
abysmal, and the black market thrived.69 This last point served as a windfall 
for the Sino-Cambodians. As the state could not always provide its employ-
ees with the food rations they were supposed to receive, the state instead 
had to supplement salaries. This was very complicated to accomplish, and 
the unsustainable system spiraled out of  control. While difficult to prove, 
it seems logical that as the state found itself  unable to provide essentials, 
the commercial enterprises run by the Chinese would become increasingly 
prominent as a means to secure food and other items. Had the state contin-
ued to try to shut these down or restrict their operations, it only would have 
hurt the legitimacy of  an already ailing and disliked government. Therefore, 
the PRK was left with little choice but to ease their implementation of  
restrictions of  the ethnic Chinese.
Thus, it can be seen that despite the egalitarian views espoused by 
the Constitution and some Western scholars, almost from its inception, the 
PRK set about isolating the Chinese community while aiding the Vietnam-
ese. This helped cause the Chinese community, which had been roughly the 
same size as the Vietnamese community before the Khmer Rouge, to have 
only an anemic resurgence while the Vietnamese population skyrocketed 
from numbering in the tens of  thousands in 1979 to the hundreds of  thou-
sands just five years later. Many of  these migrants, Vietnamese and Chinese 
alike, engaged in similar occupations, primarily involving commerce. While 
structural inadequacies prohibited the PRK from completely shutting down 
these enterprises, the hodgepodge enforcement regime that emerged seems 
to have exclusively targeted the ethnic Chinese, demonstrating the extent to 
which a social exclusive system giving preferential treatment to the ethnic 
Vietnamese was created. Not until the last half  of  the PRK’s decade in 
power did restrictions began to ease, but at this point, Vietnam and the 
KPRP were rapidly losing control over the country.
Cambodia and the World
We have seen that on a national level, Vietnam’s influence on the 
PRK government resulted in a system that benefitted the ethnic Vietnamese 
at the expense of  the Chinese. But why did Vietnam, and by extension the 
PRK, feel compelled to go to such lengths to suppress the ethnic Chinese? 
As shown above, the most severe policies targeting the Chinese were ended 
by around 1985. In looking at events around the world in the mid-1980s, a 
relationship is apparent between the decline in anti-Chinese discrimination 
in PRK policies and the emerging power dynamics between China, the 
Soviet Union, and the United States. Going back once again to the PRK 
68 Ibid., 199-200.
69 Ibid., 210-211, 215-216.
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Constitution, the Preamble states that:
The Chinese expansionists and hegemonists in 
Beijing, acting in collusion with U.S. imperialism 
and other powers, are undertaking to destroy the 
revolution of  our country. But the situation in 
Kampuchea is irreversible. Our people will cer-
tainly triumph. The enemy is doomed to failure. 
Nobody can deny the role China played in supporting the Khmer 
Rouge in its continued struggle against the PRK after the liberation of  
Phnom Penh on January 7, 1979. When the Japanese Prime Minister went 
to Beijing to try to create a political solution to the problems in Cambodia 
shortly after the invasion, Deng Xiaoping simply said, “It is wise for China 
to force the Vietnamese to stay in Kampuchea because that way they will 
suffer more and more.”70 Indeed, throughout the existence of  the PRK, 
China, along with many other countries, continued to supply the CGDK 
with the means to resist the PRK.71
China evidently chose to support the Khmer Rouge, but what was 
the connection between China and the Sino-Cambodians? Can we give any 
credence to the Vietnamese theory that China was somehow manipulating 
the Sino-Cambodians to subvert Vietnamese authority? In fact, only one 
of  seven ethnic Chinese in Cambodia was not a Cambodian citizen, and 
only one in twenty-three was born in China. Therefore, the vast majority 
of  Sino-Cambodians had at best a tenuous connection to the mainland.72 
Instead, it appears that in the wake of  the Sino-Vietnamese border conflict 
in 1979 and China’s support for the KR, Vietnam gave in to a paranoia that 
was divorced from the reality. This was due not only to the loose connec-
tion Sino-Cambodians shared with China, but also the suffering they had 
just experienced at the hands of  the Khmer Rouge. Furthermore, there is 
absolutely no evidence to suggest that Beijing was funneling resources to 
the ethnic Chinese in areas controlled by the PRK in an attempt to under-
mine Vietnamese authority. 
Accordingly, China seemingly cared little for its diaspora in Cambo-
dia, with China’s overriding concern stemming from Soviet support for the 
Vietnamese occupation of  Cambodia. China was chiefly worried that Soviet 
influence in the PRK through Vietnam posed a security threat to them and 
believed, correctly, that without Soviet support Vietnam would have to pull 
out of  Cambodia.73 So great was the threat to China that before Sino-Soviet 
talks began in 1982, Chinese Communist Party Secretary-General Hu Yao-
70 Ben Kiernan, “KAMPUCHEA 1979–81: National Rehabilitation in the Eye of  
an International Storm”. Southeast Asian Affairs. Institute of  Southeast Asian Studies 
(ISEAS) (1982): 185.
71 Gottesman, Cambodia After the Khmer Rouge, 139.
72 Ibid., 174.
73 Chang, Kampuchea Between China and Vietnam, 130-132.
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bang considered Vietnam’s occupation of  Cambodia equally as threatening 
as the presence of  Soviet troops in Afghanistan and Mongolia, declaring 
that they posed “grave threats to the peace of  Asia and to China’s security.” 
These concerns were repeated again in 1983, and in 1984, Beijing stated 
that the Soviet-Vietnamese alliance was the “root of  tension and turbulence 
in Southeast Asia and gravely threaten[ed] the security of  Kampuchea, the 
ASEAN states and China.”74 
On the Vietnamese side, mounting international opposition 
pressed them to moderate their stance in the PRK. Between 1979 and 1985, 
the number of  United Nations resolutions against Vietnam rose from 91 to 
114. At the same time, China, North Korea, ASEAN and the United States 
were providing the non-communist factions in the CGDK with aid, and 
China was also giving a substantial amount of  aid to the Khmer Rouge.75 
Furthermore, in 1983, the UN declared the crisis in Cambodia over and 
promptly banned development aid to the PRK from all UN members and 
organizations, with just a select few organizations able to deliver human-
itarian aid.76 However, while some countries were beginning to question 
the benefits of  continuing the “bleeding Cambodia and Vietnam white” 
strategy by the middle of  the decade, the United States, China, and ASEAN 
could not agree on a way forward.7778
 The tipping point ultimately came in 1985 when Deng Xiaoping 
acknowledged that China would not oppose a Soviet base in Vietnam at 
Cam Ranh Bay as long as Vietnam withdrew from Cambodia. Shortly there-
after, a senior Soviet Asia specialist told scholar Nayan Chanda “Vietnam 
would have to seek an accommodation with China. They cannot afford to 
have a hostile China on their border in perpetuity.”79
The year 1985 was important to the PRK and would leave a lasting 
impact on the country. Likewise, in many ways 1985 also marked the begin-
ning of  the end for Vietnam’s occupation of  Cambodia due to the influence 
of  other countries. As Hun Sen solidified his power in Cambodia, Vietnam 
and China underwent significant internal changes of  their own to liberalize 
their economies. These changes contributed to a ripple effect of  liberaliza-
tion in Cambodia, as it had to adapt to new economic realities. Meanwhile, 
in a sign of  warming Sino-Soviet ties, the USSR stationed twenty to twen-
ty-five naval vessels in Cam Ranh Bay in 1986, and while publicly the Soviet 
Union continued to support the Vietnamese occupation, more and more 
74 Ibid., 132.
75 Nayan Chanda, Brother Enemy: The War After the War (San Diego: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich, 1986), 392.
76 Benny Widyono, Dancing In Shadows: Sihanouk, the Khmer Rouge, and the United 
Nations In Cambodia (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008), 32.
77 “Bleeding Cambodia and Vietnam white” refers to the strategy amongst ASEAN 
states of  making it so costly to occupy Cambodia that Vietnam withdrew.
78 Ibid., 34.; Chanda, Brother Enemy, 392-393.
79 Chanda, Brother Enemy, 400-401.
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Soviet officials realized that it would be in the Soviet Union’s best interest 
for Vietnam to withdraw from Cambodia.80 As economic support for Viet-
nam declined, Vietnam’s debt began to rapidly rise. With defense against 
Khmer Rouge forces draining substantial human and financial resources 
after 1985, Vietnam’s will to continue the occupation deteriorated.81 Several 
years later, in 1988, Vietnam announced its plan to withdraw 50,000 troops 
from Cambodia by the end of  the year. Vietnam’s ten-year occupation of  
Cambodia finally came to an end as the last of  its troops withdrew on Sep-
tember 26, 1989.82
With a significant occupying force that at its height numbered well 
over one hundred thousand Vietnamese soldiers and advisors, PRK official 
policy benefitted the ethnic Vietnamese. Given the historical animosity be-
tween Cambodia and Vietnam, one cannot assume that institutions favoring 
the Vietnamese developed naturally even though Vietnam had liberated 
Cambodia from the Khmer Rouge. Although Vietnam’s influence started to 
decline after 1985, it did not decline to the extent that the PRK was able to 
permit discrimination against the ethnic Vietnamese.83
The link between international affairs during the PRK and policy 
toward Viet-Cambodians is more obscure. Certainly, there is a correlation 
between worsening Sino-Vietnamese relations in the first half  of  the 1980s 
and the various anti-Chinese policies discussed in the preceding section. In 
1980, the “fraternal intervention” of  Vietnamese advisors succeeded in cre-
ating a constitution for the PRK that eliminated any democratic choice in 
Cambodia’s leadership, thereby all but guaranteeing that Hanoi could easily 
install whomever it wanted in positions of  authority.84 The sham elections 
that subsequently occurred resulted in almost unanimous approval of  the 
Vietnam-installed leaders in the PRK, cementing Vietnam as the country 
calling the shots in Cambodia.85  It does not appear that the declining for-
tunes of  Vietnam toward the latter half  of  the decade had any effect on the 
PRK’s policy toward the ethnic Vietnamese.
The case of  the Sino-Cambodians is much more complicated. In 
order to prevent Vietnam from fully consolidating power in Cambodia and 
further surrounding China with countries in the Soviet bloc, China poured 
an enormous amount of  aid into the CGDK, most notably the Khmer 
Rouge faction. In this match of  wills, China clearly had the advantage over 
Vietnam, with top Chinese leaders recognizing that they needed to simply 
bide their time until Vietnam eventually was forced to withdraw. The PRK 
and Vietnamese officials were extremely wary of  China. On the one hand, 
the anti-Chinese policies they enacted were no doubt genuinely intended 
80 Ibid., 398, 400-401.
81 Ibid., 404; Slocomb, An Economic History of  Cambodia, 220.
82 Slocomb, The People’s Republic of  Kampuchea, 247.
83 International Centre for Ethnic Studies, Minorities In Cambodia, 20-25.
84 Gottesman, Cambodia After the Khmer Rouge, 111-113.
85 Ibid., 116-117.
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to restrict the Chinese to help combat possible enemy networks. However, 
the data clearly show that there did not exist a strong connection between 
the Sino-Cambodians and China. In order to pressure China to moderate 
its support of  the opposition and go to the negotiating table with Vietnam, 
that Vietnam urged the PRK to target the Chinese “big businesspeople,” 
believing incorrectly that China would actively try to prevent this action is 
possible.
If  this were purely the case, why would Vietnam not keep up the 
pressure throughout the 1980s? China never offered them concessions of  
any sort, nor does it seem that discrimination against the ethnic Chinese 
was a matter of  particular concern to the United Nations in the relevant 
resolutions passed between 1979 and 1984. Instead, the resolutions primar-
ily seem to urge foreign powers, specifically Vietnam, to end their occupa-
tion of  Cambodia.86 Had Vietnam wanted to continue or even expand the 
policies restricting the activities of  the Sino-Cambodians, they probably 
could have pressured the PRK government to do so. 
There are no official documents or statements that can be refer-
enced that explicitly tie policy toward the ethnic Vietnamese and Chinese 
living in Cambodia to an event going on between the major power players. 
However, it seems that the major policy shift in 1985 may have occurred 
because the Soviet Union knew that the situation in the PRK was unsus-
tainable for Vietnam. This resulted in the Soviet Union pressuring Viet-
nam to allow an easing of  the anti-Chinese policies to avoid derailing the 
ongoing Sino-Soviet rapprochement. According to China, one of  the “three 
obstacles” to Sino-Soviet normalization was Soviet support for Vietnam’s 
occupancy of  Cambodia, and, in contrast to General Secretary Konstantin 
Chernenko, who died in early 1985, Gorbachev was much more open to 
increasing ties with China.87
Shortly after the unnamed Soviet official told Nayan Chanda that 
Vietnam would have to resolve its issues with China, in 1986, Soviet Gen-
eral Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev gave a speech in Vladivostok in which 
he pledged to disengage the Soviet Union from Asia and offered to go to 
China to help create “an atmosphere of  good-neighborliness.” This was 
followed by a trip to Southeast Asia by Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard She-
vardnadze in 1987. During his time in Hanoi, he met with party leaders to 
discuss the Cambodia dilemma. Five days later, the Vietnamese Prime Min-
ister announced that Vietnam would withdraw from Cambodia by 1990.88
Ultimately, Vietnam was under intense pressure from China, the 
86 United Nations General Assembly. Case No. 57. Art. 2(7), Repertory, Suppl. 
6, vol. I (1979-1984) Accessed May, 2016. http://legal.un.org/repertory/art2/
english/rep_supp6_vol1-art2_7_e.pdf.
87 Robert C. Horn, “Vietnam and Sino-soviet Relations: What Price 
Rapprochement?”. Asian Survey 27 (7) University of  California Press (1987): 736-
740.
88 Gottesman, Cambodia After the Khmer Rouge, 277-278.
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Soviet Union, and much of  the global community to change its position 
on Cambodia to fit various agendas. The PRK likely maintained its gen-
erally pro-Viet-Cambodian policies because Vietnam’s influence was still 
such that it would not have permitted any reforms. However, a link can be 
drawn between the intensity of  the policies targeting the ethnic Chinese 
and the Soviet Union’s willingness to support Vietnam against China. Once 
the reform-minded Gorbachev came to power, though, it appears that the 
Soviet desire to improve its ties with China led to an increase in pressure on 
Vietnam to pull out of  Cambodia. A financially struggling Vietnam faced 
with a persistent insurgency in much of  the country had little option but to 
give in to Soviet demands. 
The View on the Ground
 The policy of  the PRK toward the ethnic Vietnamese and Chinese 
varied over the decade of  its existence due to a variety of  international 
and national factors. Regardless of  stated macro-level policy objectives, the 
implementation of  some policies had drastically different effects on dif-
ferent ethnic groups. The Viet-Cambodians had for decades been demon-
ized by one regime after the other, yet now found themselves enjoying, at 
least in theory, the support of  a government effectively run by Vietnam. 
Meanwhile, the Sino-Cambodians returning to Cambodia initially faced a 
tremendous amount of  suspicion and discrimination due to their alleged 
connections to China. These experiences of  ethnic Chinese and Vietnamese 
contribute to an overarching narrative of  the impact of  various government 
policies. 
When Vietnam invaded DK in December 1978, it was “in answer 
to the request of  the Kampuchean people,” freeing them from the tyranny 
of  the Khmer Rouge.89 Traveling to Cambodia shortly after the Vietnamese 
invasion, Ben Kiernan seemed to confirm this sentiment through interviews 
with a number of  people in Phnom Penh and the surrounding countryside. 
Amongst those interviewed in Phnom Penh, there was an almost unani-
mously positive view of  the invasion. While several expressed apprehension 
about the permanence of  the occupation, multiple interviewees noted that 
the Vietnamese did not kill the Cambodians, and, had Vietnam not invaded, 
many of  them would likely have been killed by the Pol Pot regime.90 Mean-
while, Kiernan found that anti-Vietnamese sentiment in the countryside 
was almost non-existent.91 Indeed, it appears that at first there was little to 
no open animosity toward the Vietnamese in the liberated areas, with some 
PRK officials (most of  whom had fled to Vietnam from DK) noting that 
the historic tensions between the two countries were now “out of  date.”92 
89 Slocomb, The People’s Republic of  Kampuchea, 47.
90 Ibid., 371-372.
91 Ibid., 374.
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As an increasing number of  Vietnamese entered Cambodia, atti-
tudes that may have been positive in the beginning began to sour. After the 
death and displacement of  millions of  Khmer during the Khmer Rouge, 
the Vietnamese, with the support of  the Vietnam-controlled government, 
began to fill the vacancies left behind in professions ranging from prostitu-
tion to teaching to civil service, despite a low level of  cultural and linguistic 
assimilation.93 
Surprisingly, even though there was a huge influx of  largely uncon-
trollable Vietnamese immigration, there are no accounts of  acts of  physical 
violence against the ethnic Vietnamese living in Cambodia. However, that 
is not to say that there was no resistance to the Vietnamese occupation. 
Gottesman provides evidence of  at least one protest that occurred in 1982 
in which teachers demonstrated against Vietnamese occupation.94 
However, these anti-Vietnamese sentiments were not uniform 
across time or space. Animosity felt by Khmers toward the Vietnamese 
varied based on the policies the Vietnam-controlled government was imple-
menting at the time as well as the exact profession of  the Vietnamese.95 The 
overall feeling toward the Vietnamese, though, was that Vietnam was using 
immigration to gain control over Khmers in Cambodia. As one opposi-
tion group proclaimed, “In its scheme, Vietnam has moved hundreds of  
thousands of  Vietnamese nationals into Cambodia as new masters of  the 
land.”96 
Ultimately, while the Khmers may not have viewed the ethnic Viet-
namese particularly favorably, they were not subjected to anything compa-
rable to what was commonplace in the Khmer Rouge or other Cambodian 
regimes. Even though that Cambodians afraid of  “Vietnamization” carried 
out acts of  violence against Vietnamese civilians was entirely possible, there 
is no textual evidence to support this.  
While there is little information regarding the treatment of  the 
ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia by the general population, there is even less 
with regards to the ethnic Chinese. In the first months following the Viet-
namese invasion, there is one account from Battambang that says that the 
ethnic Chinese who went there originally encountered a large amount of  
anti-Chinese sentiment stemming from the aid China had given the Khmer 
Rouge. However, during a mass meeting, officials with the invading Viet-
namese army pointed out that the Chinese had also suffered in DK.97 
Any anti-Chinese resentment seems to have quickly faded. We have 
seen that the ethnic Chinese faced a great deal of  discrimination from the 
93 Joachim Schliesinger, Ethnic Groups of  Cambodia, vol. 2 (Bangkok, Thailand: White 
Lotus Press, 2011), 262, 267-268.
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government as the result of  policy that itself  was caused by tensions be-
tween Vietnam and China. This was most clearly demonstrated by Circular 
351.  That the ethnic Chinese would resist regulations restricting their busi-
ness practices was to be expected. However, the government did not count 
on the extent of  the resistance from the general population. Many Cambo-
dians did not see the Chinese as potential spies, did not believe in the PRK’s 
ideas of  class struggle, and thought Chinese-controlled commercial enter-
prises were the best way to help the country’s economy. Therefore, that 
Cambodians disregarded the Vietnamese-controlled government’s attempts 
to demonize the Chinese is not too surprising.98 In sum, the actual effect of  
these policies is best described by a scholar who stated that  “Cambodians 
thus approached the Party’s policy toward the Chinese as they did commu-
nism: by ignoring it.”99
How the policies enacted by the People’s Republic of  Kampuchea 
affected the ethnic Vietnamese and Chinese living there by influencing the 
behavior of  the rest of  the Cambodian population is a topic that has not 
been the subject of  much research. In general, it seems that there was an 
overall negative attitude toward the Vietnamese, who were perceived as 
taking over the country, though this was not necessarily true from one place 
to another or from one year to the next. Just how this feeling toward the 
Vietnamese manifested itself  is not entirely clear, but most open antago-
nism was likely kept to a minimum by the occupying Vietnamese military. 
In contrast, the anti-Chinese policies created in the early 1980s were largely 
panned, despite the connection between China and the Khmer Rouge. The 
extent to which these trends were constant throughout the PRK is not 
entirely known, but that there was much variation in these sentiments is 
doubtful.
Conclusion
 Between 1979 and 1989, the People’s Republic of  Kampuchea 
frequently found itself  at the whim of  more powerful countries, especially 
Vietnam. Due to Vietnam’s influence, a series of  policies were enacted in 
the early 1980s in response to fears of  Chinese influence, resulting in the 
ethnic Chinese facing a number of  restrictions not just in terms of  their 
businesses, but also their cultural traditions. At the same time, the com-
paratively booming ethnic Vietnamese population engaged in many of  the 
same occupations and faced few if  any restrictions. Before 1985, this can 
be attributed to the ethnically stratified Marxist system that the government 
inadvertently created, in which the traditional class structure did not uni-
formly apply for the Vietnamese and Chinese. Instead, what emerged was a 
system in which the Vietnamese received preferential treatment. Meanwhile, 
98 Milton Takei, “Collective Memory as the Key to National and Ethnic Identity: 
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though, the vast majority of  the Cambodian population harbored anti-Viet-
namese sentiments as the result of  both the occupation and the traditional 
rivalry between the two countries. Despite the brokenness of  the system in 
the PRK, its policies largely mirrored events between major regional players, 
primarily Vietnam, China, and the Soviet Union. Partly because of  tensions 
between these countries the anti-Chinese policies existed prior to 1985, 
and partly because of  rapprochement and the decline of  the Soviet Union 
there was a relaxation in policies after 1985. In 1985, the KPRP’s Fifth Party 
Congress also brought to power a number of  individuals less beholden to 
Hanoi than their predecessors. 
Despite the politics occurring at the national and international 
level, the PRK was never successful at decisively turning popular opinion 
against the Sino-Cambodians, or in favor of  the Viet-Cambodians. Al-
though there was no ethnic violence in the PRK as in previous regimes, the 
distrust of  the Vietnamese and the fear of  the so-called Vietnamization of  
Cambodia pervaded the country, and the CGDK used this as propaganda 
against the government. As the Vietnamese withdrew from Cambodia in 
1989, many of  Cambodia’s traditional social cleavages were well on their 
way to re-entrenching themselves. The ethnic Chinese were once again 
cementing themselves amongst the Cambodian business elite, and the 
ethnic Vietnamese were still viewed with suspicion by much of  the general 
Cambodian population.
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